Introduction
A utilitarian philosophy of religion must treat being religious as a habit of action. So its principal concern must be the extent to which the actions of religious believers frustrate the needs of other human beings, rather than the extent to which religion gets something right. (Rorty 1999: 148) .
Nancy Frankenberry, Professor of Religion at Dartmouth College, USA, in a recent addendum to a previously published article, suggests that the ideas of American pragmatism might provide a useful framework for a feminist philosophy of religion (in Anderson and Clack) . Pragmatist philosophy is defined by the shift that its practitioners make in determining the nature of philosophical practice. Philosophy should not be understood as providing a method for assessing the factual 'truth' of propositions or beliefs, but should be used to explore the uses of such propositions or beliefs. Frankenberry details the considerable similarities between pragmatist philosophy and the concerns of feminists. She notes, for example, that both groups view scientific positivism with a critical eye; that they share a resistance to philosophies that create a dichotomy between fact and value; that they reject the idea that theory and practice are different modes of activity, insisting, to the contrary, that both activities are parts of a whole; that they resist as inappropriate and impossible the 'spectator stance' of philosophical indifference. At the same time, Frankenberry alludes to the 'untapped resources' of pragmatist thinking on religion, where transcendence is relocated within immanence, spirit within nature, salvation within community. These are the features, she suggests, that might profitably be explored through the pragmatist paradigm by feminist philosophers of religion.
Frankenberry is not alone in suggesting that pragmatism might provide an appropriate framework for feminist approaches to the study of religion. Sheila Greeve Davaney has similarly argued that a 'pragmatic historicism' provides the best framework for a twenty-first century theology (Davaney 1997 (Davaney , 2000 . While not necessarily wishing to endorse in its entirety such an approach, I want to suggest that adopting some 250 Feminist Theology aspects of the kind of pragmatism advanced by the philosopher Richard Rorty might indeed prove useful for shaping a contemporary feminist theology. Others in this edition will have suggested some of the tensions that exist between Christian feminists and 'non-Christian' feminists (specifically, in this instance, feminist thealogians). I want to suggest that these tensions might be eased if a more pragmatic attitude to the purpose of religious belief were adopted.
Two key features determine Rorty's understanding of a pragmatic philosophy. Firstly, he emphasizes the importance of deciding the usefulness of any position for furthering human happiness. In this sense, 'Truth' is determined by use, not by the extent to which any particular statement corresponds to an external, 'objective' reality. For the pragmatist, 'truth' is not associated with any external metaphysical claim which establishes 'the way things really are', but rather becomes associated with appropriate modes of behaviour in any particular community. Secondly, Rorty argues that the pragmatist's focus for developing any philosophy should be on hope rather than knowledge. In such a context, what matters is the way in which beliefs contribute to the future good, rather than how such beliefs reflect 'things as they really are'. My concern is to consider the impact that adopting such principles might have upon feminist theology, and, in particular, the way in which such ideas might prove helpful for furthering discussions between Christian feminists and Goddess women.
Feminist Theological/Thealogical Disputes
The relationship between English-speaking Christian feminists and 'non-Christian' feminists takes on rather different guises, depending upon which side of the Atlantic one inhabits. In the United States, the dominance of academic institutions by Christian concerns has led, understandably, to considerable criticism of the privileged role given to Christian theology-and by implication to Christian feminists-in the academy. So in a recent 'Roundtable' discussion in the Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion (16.2 [Fall 2000 ]) Rita M. Gross complains that the trumpeting of 'diversity' by feminist theologians is in practice 'limited to diversity within Christianity' (Gross 2000: 73) . Furthermore, she argues that there is a tendency for feminist theologians to act 'as if all theology were Christian theology' (Gross 2000: 73) . This leads her to conclude that Christian feminists 'do not recognize what it is like to be a religious minority and do not construct feminist theology that is mindful of religious diversity' (Gross 2000: 74) .
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The same discussion sees Carol Christ launching a further attack on Christian feminists, though on rather different grounds. Christ focuses on what she sees as the ignorance of Christian feminists about the Goddess, and the possible reasons for this: 'the Goddess is threatening to Christian feminist theologians because the images of the Goddess and the embodied earth-based spirituality they reflect are powerful and attractive' (Christ 2000: 81) . She suggests that the corresponding fear of the Goddess stems from a failure on the part of Christian feminists to engage with thealogical ideas. But just as Gross' comments only really make sense against the cultural backdrop of the American academy, one wonders at the extent to which Christ's comments could be accurately applied to the British context. Indeed, Christ locates her comments firmly in an American context: 'I wonder how different our work and our dialogue might be if all of us were not constrained and seduced by the economic powers of the church and the academy' (Christ 2000: 82) . In secular Britain, it is difficult to see the Church as that powerful a force: although colleagues working in institutions with a religious foundation would probably disagree. I wonder, though, whether the British scene is more accurately defined by the inability of many educational institutions to take seriously the study of religion at all.
In a later interview, Christ acknowledges significant differences between the American and British contexts (Mantin 2002) . She is impressed that British feminist theologians and thealogians are talking to each other. And indeed the kind of tribalism that Christ identifies with the American academy does not seem to be such a feature of the British scene; or at least as far as the relationships between feminists go. So, for example, Christian feminists like Lisa Isherwood have been particularly supportive of the work of feminists in thealogy, while the engagement with Sophia seems to have furthered the conversation between feminists with different religious commitments.
The remainder of this paper will explore further ways of developing such constructive discussion, and will do so by considering the ramifications of adopting a more pragmatic framework. My contention is that an overly representational view of truth underpins and sustains apparent differences between feminists, and that adopting a pragmatic framework might enable us to avoid the diversions of division by focusing on the practical importance of furthering feminism's liberating agenda.
Truth in Community: The Art of Compromise
Discussions of the nature of 'truth' have invariably revolved around distinctions between correspondence and coherence theories of language.
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According to correspondence theories of truth, a statement is true if it corresponds to a state of affairs external to itself. In this sense, language and beliefs are 'representations' of a truth that transcends these human forms. In a theo/alogical context, religious language is thus 'true' if it corresponds to a divine that similarly transcends human life and community. Coherence theories of truth are different: a statement is true if it coheres or 'fits in' with other ideas held by a particular community. Invariably, philosophers who emphasize the way in which 'truths' attain their power through their connection with other communal beliefs have been labelled relativist, for to adopt such a framework is to accept that truth is not absolute but only ever relative to an individual or group.
Pragmatists are often accused of being relativist as they seem to adopt the coherence theory of truth. Rorty's response to this (invariably critical) comment is to resist such a description. His reasoning on this point is interesting. He argues that distinctions between correspondence and coherence theories of truth simply reflect the dualistic division of reality that the pragmatist wishes to reject. For the pragmatist to accept that they are relativist is to implicitly accept the Platonic division of reality into oppositional binaries. Famously, Plato divided reality along the following lines: reality is contrasted with appearance, the rational with the irrational, theory with practice, reason with desire (see, for example, Republic V). In practice, one side of the equation is valued at the expense of the other: and as feminists have noted, the history of Western philosophy is marked by the identification of the male with what is valuable, the female with what is not valuable (Lloyd 1984; Grimshaw 1986; Anderson 1998 : Part I).
Rorty, in common with feminist philosophers, wishes to reject this way of thinking in its entirety. As such, he is not prepared to accept the legitimacy of the 'realist'/'anti-realist' debate which divides philosophers into two opposing camps: those who accept the existence of a 'reality' in contradistinction to human desires and preferences, and those who argue that there is no 'reality' apart from that created by human language (cf. Rorty 1996) . Instead, he argues that the pragmatist makes a distinction between the more useful and the less useful (Rorty 1996: xxii) . Such an approach explicitly resists dualistic construction, for all attempts to give meaning to human life are seen as on a continuum, an image that emphasizes commonality, instead of being structured by a 'line' that divides like from unlike. 1 The pragmatist goal is linked directly to the idea of 'use', for their overriding commitment is to the creation of a better future (cf. Rorty 1994: 27) . It is the explicit connection between philosophy and social hope that I find particularly exciting as a feminist philosopher of religion. Debate becomes less a matter of abstract objectification, and more a way of seeking the good for our world and our communities.
The emphasis on practical engagement is further underscored when we consider the effect that adopting such a framework has upon the theory of language. Language ceases to be seen as that which represents reality. Instead, words are viewed 'as nodes in the causal network which binds the organism together with its environment' (Rorty 1996: xxiii) . We are not quasi-transcendent observers but participants in the world, irrevocably entwined in the web of life. Responsibility to 'Truth' or 'Reason' is thus 'replaced by talk about our responsibility to our fellow human beings' (Rorty 1999: 148) .
How might these ideas impact upon the way in which we approach debates between Christian feminists and feminist thealogians? It seems to me that our discussions are still determined by the kind of Platonic dualisms that Rorty and feminist philosophers have been at pains to reject. Consider, for example, the way in which the realist/anti-realist structure has been applied to discussions of the Goddess. Much of my own writing on this theme has been dominated by this idea. So I have argued that the Goddess is not conceived by thealogians as an existent reality in contradistinction to the way in which the divine has tended to be understood in Western Christianity (Clack 1995) . Now, while such an approach probably says much about the way in which I approach the nature of religion (that it is about creating meaning, as much as finding meaning), fitting the Goddess into such a framework probably forces a misrepresentation of beliefs about the Goddess, as well as Christianity. For a start, while 'anti-realist' might be a term accurately applied to women like Nelle Morton, and perhaps Starhawk, it ignores the sensibilities of other Goddess women. For example, Carol Christ describes the Goddess as both 'the power of life, death and renewal and … a personal presence whose nature is loving' (Mantin 2002: 120) . Similarly, while the Christian tradition could be described as presenting a 'realist' God, there are also Christians who refuse to see God in this way, a notable example being Don Cupitt.
Such reflections may say much about my own weaknesses as a scholar, but I think that more importantly they reveal the continuing power that Platonic dualism has to structure Western thinking. 2 Under this structure 254 Feminist Theology the divine must be either real or a human creation. While this limits our understanding of the divine and how religious language is in practice used, it also leads to the conclusion that only one of our respective worldviews can possibly be correct: one of our world-views must more accurately correspond to reality than the other. By necessity you must be either a Christian or a follower of the Goddess, either a realist or an antirealist. Despite the apparent rejection of the correspondence theory of truth by the anti-realist, in practice defining oneself in opposition to 'realism' means accepting, albeit implicitly, that one position more adequately corresponds to the nature of reality than the other.
My question is whether the implicit acceptance of such dualistic thinking means that we fail to use all the tools available to us to shape our hopes for the future. If we give up the dependence on dualisms of all kinds, perhaps we might be able to judge the usefulness-or otherwiseof our respective beliefs for building new and liberating communities.
Consider the question Rorty asks when addressing the issue of a belief's meaningfulness: 'For what purposes would it be useful to hold that belief?' (Rorty 1996: xxiv; my emphasis) . Taking this principle seriously would mean that beliefs are treated 'not as representations but as habits of action' (Rorty 1996: xxv) , as ways of helping us to shape our behaviour. This does not mean that we will no longer be in a position to make decisions about the efficacy or otherwise of religious systems. Rather it means that our judgments will be based not upon the extent to which such systems correspond to some reality external to human language and society, but upon the extent to which such systems contribute to the happiness of human beings. 3 Taking such an idea seriously might mean adopting a more eclectic, less sectarian approach to the religious ideas that we allow to shape our theo/alogies. So we might consider the way in which key Christian stories have promoted social justice. 4 We might consider the effective way in which the story of Christ's Passion helps us to engage with the inevitability of loss and suffering in human life; or the way in which the cross shows that wickedness must be resisted and can, indeed, be overcome. Similarly, stories of the Goddess in her many forms may help us to engage with the world around us, seeing ourselves as part of the web of life, rather than beings who transcend it. Reflecting on the Godcartes' mind/body dualism continues to shape our understanding of ourselves (see Fergus Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986] ).
3. By 'happiness' I have in mind the Greek notion of 'eudaimonia', often translated as 'happiness' but more adequately defined as 'fulfillment' or 'contentment'.
4. Although I am aware that Carol Christ would argue that the monopoly on social justice is a claim much overplayed by Christians. dess enables the de-centering of the human in order to value all things. Now, clearly, our personal preferences are likely to make us gravitate to one set of stories rather than another. But I am suggesting that rather than encounter each other as holding mutually exclusive positions we might enter our discussions with an eye towards our common goal: in this case, the desire for women's liberation and the transformation of human society.
Evidently this suggests a central role for compromise. And it is undoubtedly at this point that the greatest challenge might be made to the position I have so far advocated. Rorty expresses the centrality of compromise for pragmatism in terms that may make us feel deeply uncomfortable. Our choices, he argues, are not between 'good' and 'evil', but between different goods. And of course this is the logical conclusion for a philosophy that is radically anti-dualist, for according to the pragmatist 'good' and 'evil' are simply terms that reflect the platonic desire to divide reality into opposing binaries.
How should feminists respond to this idea? After all, we have been much concerned with the struggle to name and reject the 'evil' of patriarchy. Similarly, given our commitment to justice, any attempt to downgrade evil into a 'lesser' good should be treated with suspicion. What is 'good', say, about the murder of a child, or the torture of suspected witches during the Burning Times? Rorty's response to such criticisms is interesting: 'moral struggle is continuous with the struggle for existence, and no sharp break divides the unjust from the imprudent, the evil from the expedient' (Rorty 1996: xxix) . In other words, his concern is that when particular groups or individuals are identified as 'evil', there is a tendency to avoid recognizing the common humanity that unites us. In such a context, we avoid grappling with such horrors, instead oversimplifying the sources of wickedness. 5 Moreover, he questions what the language of 'good' and 'evil' actually achieves: 'What matters…is devising ways of diminishing human suffering and increasing human equality, increasing the ability of all human children to start life with an equal chance of happiness' (Rorty 1996: xxix) . Compromise is seen less as a theoretical ideal and more as a practical virtue that enables us to work together to achieve the goods we desire.
But could such a shift in emphasis achieve the just society for which feminists strive? Let us consider its implications in more detail. In a powerful essay, Harriet Harris challenges the attempt to split ethical and epistemological concerns in the way Rorty seems to suggest (Harris 2001) . Midgley (1984) and Erich Fromm (1997 Fromm ( [1973 ).
A similar position is held by both Mary
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The focus for her argument is specific and, while dealing less with the issue of human wickedness, raises questions that are nevertheless pertinent when analyzing the implications of accepting the pragmatist dismissal of 'good' and 'evil'. Harris considers the compromises made by the Church of England in the wake of the historic decision in 1992 to allow the ordination of women. An Act of Synod was passed which allowed for the co-existence of 'two integrities' in the Anglican Church: those who supported the ordination of women and those who did not. Harris argues that the ramifications of this compromise suggest something of the problems of living with dishonesty. In practice, the position of women priests is undermined by the institutional support for those who reject women's ministry. As Harris points out, the church is refusing to name as 'wrong' discrimination against women, and this compromise has practical consequences.
While ostensibly Rorty and Harris seem to be concerned with different issues, their positions are ultimately determined by different claims as to the relationship between human language and reality. Rorty argues that ethical action does not require a realist epistemology, while Harris argues that, to be effective, it does. Rorty's response to such claims is worth exploring, for it suggests a shifting of the ground on which such debates take place. Rorty argues that the goal of achieving human happiness is worth dying for, 'but it does not require back up from supernatural sources' (Rorty 1996: xxix) . Does the use of language like 'good' or 'evil' actually facilitate the change that radicals wish to see? Or does it perhaps suggest a desire to distance and detach ourselves from our opponents? We are back to the principle claim of the pragmatist: of what use is such language?
Now, it may be the case that Harris is correct, and that precisely why we need such language is to facilitate and support our ability to name what is wrong as 'wrong'. And I am sympathetic to this argument. But it is not self-evident that to adopt a pragmatist position would, necessarily, weaken our ability to respond appropriately to the unjust actions of others. At the end of his biography of Stalin, the historian Robert Conquest makes the following comment while trying to ascertain why his subject acted in the frequently appalling ways that he did. I think his comments throw some light on this issue:
Stalin was the incarnation of an intensely active force, in conflict with humanity and reality, like an only vaguely humanoid troll or demon from some sphere or dimension in which alien physical and moral laws apply, who tries to force the differently ordered Middle Earth to fit his rules. But that is hyperbole. Even if Stalin was one of those in whom the conception of such mythological monstrosities may in earlier terms have had their origi-nal basis, he was, after all, a human being. He was mortal and he died. After a time his system and his ideas died too (Conquest 2000 (Conquest [1991 : 327; my emphasis).
'He was, after all, a human being'. And perhaps that comment reveals something of the problems that arise from employing the dualistic language of 'good' and 'evil', for such language may encourage us to ignore the common ground between us and the perpetrator of terrible (or unjust) deeds. Does the naming of a 'monster' mean that we ignore the common ground between 'us and them'? 6 Such language may enable us to express our outrage at such acts, but does precious little to facilitate the transformation of human society, for the monster is as much a product of that society as we ourselves. 7 And at this point it is important to note that the pragmatist is not arguing that once we see our connection with those who perpetrate terrible (or unjust) acts we will cease to struggle against such behaviour. Rorty may write that 'we decent, liberal, humanitarian types (representatives of the moral community to which both my reviewers and I belong) are just luckier, not more insightful, than the bullies with whom we struggle' (Rorty 1996: 15) ; but the end of that sentence is important, for the bullies are those with whom we struggle. And he goes on: 'It is one thing to say, falsely, that there is nothing to choose between us and the Nazis. It is another thing to say, correctly, that there is no neutral, common ground to which an experienced Nazi philosopher and I can repair in order to argue out our differences' (Rorty 1996: 15) . In recognizing the interconnection between human beings, we are forced to recognize our similarities, but that does not mean that, to use Rorty's example, the horrors of Nazism become acceptable.
These comments are not meant to downplay the significance of Harris's criticisms: far from it, for she shows how any dualistic split between knowledge and practice may have ethical ramifications. But at the same time I am not convinced that the criticisms she makes are necessarily insurmountable for the pragmatist. If anything, her comments highlight the importance of struggle. We need to engage with the ideas of others but we must also have clear ideas about what, precisely, we want our beliefs to achieve.
Feminist Hope: Shaping the Future
The importance of struggle for achieving justice is intimately connected to the second area of pragmatist thinking that I wish to consider. The 258 Feminist Theology pragmatist, Rorty argues, considers the validity of beliefs in so far as they contribute to a better future for human beings. This orientation towards the future arguably moves the pragmatist even further away from philosophies based upon largely Platonic concerns with acquiring 'true' knowledge. Pragmatism, Rorty argues, 'substitutes the notion of a better human future for the [platonic] notions of 'reality', 'reason' and "nature" ' (Rorty 1994: 27) . It is the hope for and commitment to social justice that forms 'the only basis for a worthwhile human life' (Rorty 1998: 204) . Thus, the commitment to epistemological certainty is rejected in favour of commitment to the kind of praxis that would bring about such a future.
Liberation theologies have famously identified hope as an integral part of the Christian gospel (cf. Moltmann 1967 Moltmann [1965 1975) , and this theme also informs aspects of feminist theologies which share the central concern with liberation. For the purposes of this paper, I wish to consider what such an orientation towards the future might mean for discussions between religious feminists. If our focus is on the future, does this mean that concern with the past becomes less significant and our responses to each other less hind-bound by historical issues than by the future we might shape together? This is not to say that we forget the historical situatedness of our beliefs. As Davaney points out, any discussion between religious traditions takes place 'not in spite of our historical particularity, but because of it' (Davaney 2000: 171) . We must always remember that belief systems and the ways of life that they support develop in particular historical settings, over long periods of time. But recognizing the importance of historical development need not go along with ideas that history must be normative: if anything, considering the different historical forms of a faith will reveal the extent to which no tradition is monolithic. To adopt the pragmatist paradigm is to accept that these positions are not revelations of some external truth, but rather reveal the extent to which human beings constantly shape and create values and attitudes, drawing upon the sources that are available at the time, but often developing these sources in new and creative ways. So consider the way in which Augustine's theology develops from his attempt to bring together Christian themes with elements of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Even apparently 'timeless truths' must be interpreted in new ways for new times, and this may mean using ideas drawn from very different systems of belief.
So what might this orientation towards the future mean for discussions between religious feminists? Consider two examples: first, the feminist critique of Christianity, of which my own work has been a part. To what extent is the concern with the injustices of the past inclined to obscure the value and potential of some Christian stories for shaping a just and happy future? Clearly this is a contentious point. Daphne Hampson, for example, would argue that the past is significant precisely because the patriarchal world that shaped Christianity continues to influence Christian norms and practices. And this means that Christianity is ultimately a reactionary force that hinders our construction of a just future for all human beings (Hampson 1996a) .
But perhaps such an interpretation can only come about if we accept conservative claims that Christian scriptures are the final word in the development of 'man's' relationship with 'his' God: that they are not, if you like, open to the kind of re-visioning that seems to categorise the history of theological thinking. The kind of literary approach that feminists like Jane Shaw and Nicola Slee bring to the reading of the Christian gospel suggests significantly more flexibility to the reading and use of these texts than Hampson would allow (Hampson 1996b ).
Rorty's reading of such narratives is interesting, and focuses on the way in which such stories shape political action. He uses a powerful and rather beautiful phrase when he critiques and considers Christian and Marxist accounts of the future. Such writings, he says, express 'glorious hopes' (Rorty 1998: 201) . While they may not always have provided the means to attaining the kind of just future to which they aspire, and, while he feels that neither is really suited to bringing about the future we desire now (cf. Rorty 1998: 202) , he again focuses on the use of such ideas for shaping the future, rather than simply upon the way in which such ideas have been interpreted historically. As he puts it, he is grateful for such texts as their ideals have 'helped make us better' (Rorty 1998: 209) . This claim suggests the possibility of adopting a different set of criteria for assessing belief systems. Of course, we may still reject their appropriateness for structuring the kind of just society we would like to see. But such a future-orientated critique may be a more constructive way of proceeding than simply assessing the use to which such stories have been put in the past. There are many different ways of reading such stories, and, after all, not all have been negative.
Or consider a second example: consistently the proponents of Goddess spirituality have been criticized for suggesting that there is a historical basis for the contemporary revival of interest in the Goddess. Rosemary Radford Ruether, in particular, has been forthright in her rejection of the claims that there was a 'golden age' prior to patriarchy which was matrifocal and peaceful (Ruether 1990: 843) . Similarly, it might be argued that any attempt to view the Goddesses of the past as 'proto-feminist' ignores the extent to which such images were shaped less by women, and more by patriarchal norms. An apt example of this process is provided by 260
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Athene, patron Goddess of Athens, who springs from Zeus' thigh readyarmed, and who rejects the mother in favour of the father. She could hardly be embraced as a feminist icon, and in fact supports patriarchal power by diminishing anything that might be associated with the female.
But if we follow Rorty, rather than focus upon perceptions of the past, we might be better advised to consider such stories in the light of our future hopes. For example, many stories about the Goddess can be viewed as supporting a particular attitude to the planet that undercuts any simplistic anthropocentrism and focuses on the connections we have with all things. In the words of a popular Pagan chant, 'The Earth is our Mother, we will take care of her. The Earth is our Mother, she will take care of us'. Indeed, one aspect of Rorty's pragmatism that I am less comfortable with is its explicit anthropocentrism. What is 'good' is what is good for human beings. So responsibility is invariably defined as our responsibility to human beings (Rorty 1999: 148) , while technology is lauded as the chief means of eradicating poverty, with little discussion of the implications of industrial technologies for the ecosystem as a whole (Rorty 1992: 228) .
Davaney recognizes this weakness and, drawing upon the insights of Sallie McFague, William Dean and Gordon Kaufman, argues that: 'there is no human history that can be attended to outside the constraints and possibilities of the non-human world' (Davaney 2000: 176) . Here, the stories of the Goddess are particularly helpful, as they provide ways of de-centering ourselves, looking at things not just from the human perspective, but also from the perspective of nature 'herself'. Just as the pragmatist challenges us to think again about the language of good and evil, it is important to challenge any straightforward notion of what is 'good' for human beings. Excessive consumption, material possessions and instant gratification may not be the best way of cultivating a meaningful human life. Our notion of what constitutes the 'good life' needs to reflect upon what is good for the planet and its different life-systems as a whole. The language of the Goddess may be peculiarly suited to facilitating this end.
Reflection on what constitutes the meaningful life leads to some further reservations regarding the pragmatist reorientation towards the future. While the focus on the future is undoubtedly necessary for shaping social policy and public praxis in order to attain the transformation of society, I am not altogether convinced of the value of such an orientation for living happy lives as individuals. Past theologies that overemphasized the eschatological dimension promoted terror at the cost of human happiness in the here-and-now (cf. Camporesi 1991) . And even if 'the future' need not be understood in such otherworldly terms, I
wonder if any happiness we might find as individuals lies in living fully in the present moment. The kind of spiritual exercises employed by Hellenistic philosophers such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius seem specifically designed to focus the mind upon the present moment. For these Stoic philosophers, we should not base our happiness in the uncertain future, but should accept the gift of each moment of life that is bestowed upon us. Seneca suggests that before we sleep we should say: 'I have lived. I have completed now the course that fortune long ago allotted me. If God adds the morrow we should accept it joyfully. The man who looks for the morrow without worrying over it knows a peaceful independence and a happiness beyond all others. Whoever has said "I have lived" receives a windfall every day he gets up in the morning' (Seneca 1969: 59) . If we are to be truly happy, a balance must be attained between our hopes for the future and the significance of the present. Approaching theo/alogy as a means of developing narratives to help us live more appropriately in this world enables us to go some way to achieving this balance.
Conclusion
The intention of this paper has been to explore what it might mean to adopt a pragmatic framework for shaping feminist theo/alogies. As such, I have focused on the place given to usefulness and the future in Richard Rorty's pragmatism. Underpinning all these discussions is the utilitarian aim that Rorty states in the passage that introduced this paper: to what extent do our religious beliefs and systems support and facilitate human happiness? In many ways, this has been an exploratory paper, for while I think that there may be clear benefits from adopting such an approach, I am not altogether sure how far such notions should or indeed could shape our theo/alogies. My interest in pragmatism stems from the concern to find a framework that enables us to work creatively together to achieve the transformation of society that we desire. Thus shifting our concerns away from epistemology towards efficacy seems to me to suggest one possible way of moving together towards this liberating end. 'What works' becomes more important than 'what is'.
An obvious criticism of such an approach revolves around the consequences of ditching the notion of 'Truth' with a capital 'T'. To what extent does such a move make it more difficult to resist falsity and lies? And this, it seems to me, is the single most important challenge for the pragmatist to face, for it may be that the language of correspondence to truth is of real use for bringing about a just society. At the same time, I have suggested that accepting the pragmatist argument does not lead to
